Very good point. In fact the periodic location update is freezing moving into the LA as the OCTs are not connected to any Core Network. Setting the EFHPLMN on value '00' (no HPLMN search attemps (GSM 11.11/10.2.5) would be an obstacle with devastating consequences in case of emergency.
Let me mention a non-technical but very sensible aspect about 'Tech in the Alps'. Public opinion in Switzerland is completely against more cell towers in general and especially in nature. People feel badly surveilled if 'real' cell towers would be installed. Nature is an area of multiple activities including very sensible activities like sunbathing, nudity or sex. This is the reason that a video-based solution for emergency is not possible. So the discussion started about cell towers like microwave-based point-to-point small cells. But small cells cause a new problem People feel deceived. We live in the post-Snowden time.
To kill the aspect of latent fear of surveillance it was decided to focus on Offline but for Emergency.
Offline Cell Towers (OCT) would assure to the public that no live tracking would be possible. OCTs would be like 'silent graves' but able to open for exhumation.
Actually the difficult process is the handover process form Online Area to the Logged Area. Its not a default handover request with acknowledgement. You may question What knows the OCT? The answer is state-based. In Idle State (IS) Just a table of IMEIs and timestamps and their respective signal parameters. In Emergency State (ES) The OCT becomes a connected OCT (cOCT) and gets all data from the - now connected - MCT.
From the MS/UE perspective its important to notice that the device does not recognize the move from OA to LA. As users associate that they have full network reception (bars visible on GUI) they think that they can send/receive data/calls. For this a new tiny icon or Type 0 SMS should inform the user that he is now logged for emergency, but not able to use the MS/UE in common handling.
The FTTA concept is absolutely newborn.
How an OCT can talk to a MS/UE and same can camp on idle state on the OCT is very tricky as it should serve non-operator based and without any user credentials like crypto, HLR…
As promised to the public that the system would only in state of emergency change state from IS to ES / OCT to cOCT it is not possible to periodic 'update' the OCTs. How to maintain an offline system in general is very difficult if not possible manually (in this case impossible).
As the solution will be 5G based and maybe using the 700MHz baseband (very good wave) its discussed if the OCTs to the MS/UEs would use the PTT-mode itself but not allow PTT between users. But setting up a 5G network and covering all previous generations is also unclear now.
The reason to focus on 5G was that manufacturers are more willing to customize and engineer a new solution like this in a new technology.
About the star-network aspect. Its neither all options you mentioned. A better picture to illustrate would be a beacon on the shore lightning at far away ships. The Master Cell Tower (MCT) would be the beacon and the OCTs the ships.
I apologize for complicated explanations as not allowed to post graphics but wanted to open in an early state for collaboration as COLLABORATION IS THE KEY.
Are you in touch with a regulatory body? I doubt, that they will like a decentralized data retention infrastructure. A more common paradigm for such an installation is, to keep data volatile at the sensor end (where technical and organisational measures are fairly limited) and store data in a centralized, well protected database. This comes with data protection issues, of course, but is probably preferred over "silent graves" in the middle of nowhere.
This concept also doesn't help much on the rest of its legal playground, since it is only about access management. Data collection itself is highly regulated.
You don't provide any service to which the location data could be a necessary by-product. You exploit the fact that people carry a device which emits radio signals to log this data without their consent or knowledge, not only in a case of emergency but all the time.
I don't see, how a conventional communications network could be worse. It can even be switched off, if zero bars on her phone make the not-yet-lost person feel better (and, for a considerable amount of time, the lost person gets an enlightening view on how little the surveillance state actually cares about her).
Thank you C.R.S. - excellent post and very important aspects you highlight.
The FTTA proj is of course in collaboration with BAKOM the regulatory body in-country. Also data protection and privacy is on top of the list. Its here a big discussion of either expand mobile broadband into nature at all. Its obvious that the public and/or political opposition will enflame.
There is much advantage of keeping volatile data centralized stored in a DB. But privacy is against centralization. To proof that these OCTs are completely offline it is highly discussed that they have to be autark under the term 'No cables - No Tracking!'. Mobile power outdoor is difficult and autark during e.g. winter season also not an easy task. To improve the financial aspect for a better cost-benefit-balance the commercial use of location data - could - be a by-product. But privacy is against this and location data only makes sense if timeline-related which means a chain-topology.
The Logged Area (LA) starts where the Online Area (OA) ends - theoretically. Technically by radio signal propagation but this is not possible by changing troposheric conditions and undefined reflection or transmission types (reflection, refraction, diffraction, absorption, scattering - transmission straight almost never happens in reality). To log data without consent or knowledge is legally forbidden by good reasons. How to inform users entering into LAs and allow them a second option as just turning off their mobiles is in discussion. It is a no-go to just offer to turn off as it is crucial to have connection in case of emergency - but lets be honest User have no knowledge where they have access in rural areas, its an element of hope of 'having access in case of emergency'.
Concluded its obvious that privacy concern would kill this proj, that is the reason after heated discussions to bring-in the elment of offline ('No cables - No Tracking!).
If not offline. No chance.
People having no bars of reception in hiking areas feel worse, not better.
Its all about paying the price of offline but offering the element of help (higher chance to survive) in case of emergency. Alpine rescue work today is - and this is agreed by all involved partners - a highly suboptimal process and wasting/losing time-critical resources if allocated on the false location combined with the fact that misallocation cannot be changed fast enough in rural areas.
As LE we are not in lead but involved from the beginning to bring in our view.
Where am I wrong in my point of view? - like to learn from others.
How would you convince the public to agree on the 'Public Logging for Emergency' (PLE)?
How would you solve/improve the actual situation?
Would you say yes or no if asked?
Thank you for collaboration.
https://
The gentleman that runs the above website is a pretty knowledgeable individual. I know he works with the Civil Air Patrol and they have had a great deal of success in locating handsets. I believe he has developed a program that has the ability to analyze topography, elevation and signal strength to provide points or areas of interest.
If I seem off base with a few of my comments please forgive me. I believe there may be some slight differences in terminology from what I am use to.
In an earlier post I saw "MNO/MVNO." Seeing how the MVNO's are piggybacking off the MNO's was this, or is it being suggested that any data, signals and or traffic is handled differently by a MS that is an MVNO handset vs. an MNO handset?
Much of what can and can't be done is going to rely in what data the Telco lets you know that they have. Here in the U.S. we can obtain enhanced ranging data (Timing Advance) from some CDMA providers. I know a gentleman who watched TA being generated during an emergency while he stood in a call center, but the GSM providers claim that they do not retain this data once the call is terminated. "???????????"
Greg, mentioned periodic location updates. I'd certainly like to know how that might work, but is the previous location data retained, or overwritten?
Another aspect to this is an HLR/VLR reset and could you possibly use that data and a last known point to formulate a target area based on a time distance formula? I know of one occasion where this worked, but I would think it would be hard to do in the mountains.
In addition to the MS itself, if it were a smart phone is it possible that there may be other apps installed that are generating location data? If so, how do you obtain that information in an emergency?
Fascinating topic.
Rolf, I have some ideas about this scenario which my ideas are conceptual, not proof of concept. I need more info from you as suggesting a mountain is not enough and takes no account of the reality of the conditions a lost person may find him/herself.
Whilst I am mindful of
This case is part of our Last Living Location (LLL) research.
Yes, but you equally added conditions such as 'privacy', potential civilian reaction in protection of personal movements data, 5G solution, fibre, and so on. Solution to these issues might be possible to be incorporated to the mechanisms I am considering regarding track and trace.
a lost person on a unknown mountain area with not short-range cell towers nearby.
Can you provide example details of the various mountains, topology and topography you have in mind (but various weather conditions can be assumed at this stage)? And the location of the primary Mast (cell site/BTS, nodeB). Also confirm if at the primary mast we are dealing with GSM (but I note you squeezed in freq 700MHz). The country is assumed to be Switzerland, unless you state otherwise.
Thank you trewmte. Great offer!
To reduce complexity lets model in GSM for now, if you agree on this.
MLP sample risc areas Brisi B), Wetterhorn W), Mont Vélan M)
Elevation (E) in meters (m)
Location GSM Celltower (LGC) based on World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS 84)
Weather conditions in Swiss Alps (low brew) Southfoehn, see here
http//
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1st link see the area and closest cell tower
2nd link see the nature
3rd link see the hiking (yellow=easy, red=advanced) trails
B) Brisi, Alt St.-Johann (E 2278m)
LGC 47.17130, 9.25433 (lat/lon) (E 1622m) Breitenalp, Strichboden
https://
https://
https://
area info Brisi is a popular allyear target approached from the north
W) Wetterhorn, Grindelwald (E 3692m)
LGC 46.65614, 8.10.118 (lat/lon) (E 1969m) Grosse Scheidegg
https://
https://
https://
area info Wetterhorn gets allyear mostly approached from the north
M) Mont Vélan, Bourg-Saint-Bernard (E 3726m)
LGC 45.90140, 7.19488 (lat/lon) (E 1915m) Bourg-Saint-Bernard (two towers closely)
https://
https://
https://
area info Mont Vélan gets allyear approached from the north
Mountain Emergency Stats 2015
http//
If you face problems opening links or other details, pls let me know
Happy hiking summer 2017- Welcome to Switzerland -)
The radio propagation is influenced by several factors, see here
https://
May some readers do not agree in general with this approach.
Do you see alternatives to save lives and make alpine rescue services more effective?
Shall all people on the earth carry satellite phones to track them any place any time?
Please bring-in your perspective and experience for the good of saving lives.
Thank you!
The FTTA proj is of course in collaboration with BAKOM the regulatory body in-country. Also data protection and privacy is on top of the list.
Still in research mode… Re data protection. Mobile phone user cannot prevent the operator harvesting USER ID in its network; no public outrage to that. If public didn't like it, then don't use a mobile phone.
MOUNTAIN NOTICE
(i) If written notice warned smartphone users that the region that they entered, for the purposes of saving lives, requires their smartphone USER ID to be held "temporarily" - until it is detected user smartphone has left designated area - would this be a problem under data protection?
MOUNTAIN USER
(ii) If USER ID data held temporarily in central server only for period whilst person is on mountain trail walking paths would that be seen as problem under data protection?
EMERGENCY RESPONDER
(iii) If agreement was reached between Regulator, GSMA, Operators, that the central server was pro-tempore an "emergency passive **BTS" (meaning receiver and not transmitter for purposes of providing a telecommunication service) would that be seen as problem under data protection?
**BTSs can hold tarried data (held for a period) but those data are ephemeral (they are jettisoned after event exceeded).
Thank you trewmte.
i) MOUNTAIN NOTICE
It will be a requirement due to unexpected new infrastructure in a non-expected pristine environment (nature).
ii) MOUNTAIN USER
To offer only to switch-off the mobile to avoid tracking is against the people's claim of letting the mobile switched-on for 'if-I-am-in-danger'. In Switzerland operators hold mobile broadband metadata in the future for 12 months. A central-stored solutions would fail in the public's view as felt like tracking.
iii) EMERGENCY RESPONDER
From the privacy and data protection's view this would not violate actual data protection law. Its to consider that law and infrastructure are in a cat-and-mouse race. Setting-up infrastructure under actual law would be fine, but maybe in the future excluded but not reversible in reality.
Thinking innovative and placing in thousands of rocks active emergency responders to only collect that a MLP had passed this location is not efficient. The OCTs would act as 'to-see-the-laterMLP-as-long-as-possible' and only giving evidence of walkingline which would offer e.g. 'indicators-of-difficulties' if a laterMLP would straying around combined with actual weather conditions e.g. smoog, snowstorm.
Summarized The benefit of having a higher probability to survive or get help has to be stronger than the emotional cost of tracking. The political echolon would oppose OCTs for sure if the public opinion is against it. This especially if Switzerland is the first country in Europe to start this.
Its a political problem if technically not as 'minimum-of-tracking' solved. So its first a technical problem.