Microsoft’s BitLocker

BitLocker Drive Encryption is a new security feature in Windows Vista, designed to work with the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Basically, it encrypts the C drive with a computer-generated key. In its basic mode, an attacker can still access the data on the drive by guessing the user’s password, but would not be able to get at the drive by booting the disk up using another operating system, or removing the drive and attaching it to another computer…CRYPTO-GRAM



May 15, 2006



by Bruce Schneier

Founder and CTO

Counterpane Internet Security, Inc.

[email protected]

http://www.schneier.com

http://www.counterpane.com





A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and

commentaries on security: computer and otherwise.



For back issues, or to subscribe, visit

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html.



You can read this issue on the web at

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0604.html. These same essays

appear in the “Schneier on Security” blog:

http://www.schneier.com/blog. An RSS feed is available.





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In this issue:

Movie Plot Threat Contest: Status Report

Who Owns Your Computer?

Crypto-Gram Reprints

Identity-Theft Disclosure Laws

When “Off” Doesn’t Mean Off

News

RFID Cards and Man-in-the-Middle Attacks

Software Failure Causes Airport Evacuation

Counterpane News

Microsoft’s BitLocker

The Security Risk of Special Cases

Comments from Readers





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Movie Plot Threat Contest: Status Report







On the first of last month, I announced my (possibly First) Movie-Plot

Threat Contest.



“Entrants are invited to submit the most unlikely, yet still plausible,

terrorist attack scenarios they can come up with.



“Your goal: cause terror. Make the American people notice. Inflict

lasting damage on the U.S. economy. Change the political landscape, or the

culture. The more grandiose the goal, the better.



“Assume an attacker profile on the order of 9/11: 20 to 30 unskilled

people, and about $500,000 with which to buy skills, equipment, etc.”



As of the end of the month, the blog post has 782 comments. I expected a

lot of submissions, but the response has blown me away.



Looking over the different terrorist plots, they seem to fall into

several broad categories. The first category consists of attacks

against our infrastructure: the food supply, the water supply, the

power infrastructure, the telephone system, etc. The idea is to

cripple the country by targeting one of the basic systems that make it

work.



The second category consists of big-ticket plots. Either they have

very public targets – blowing up the Super Bowl, the Oscars, etc. – or

they have high-tech components: nuclear waste, anthrax, chlorine gas, a

full oil tanker, etc. And they are often complex and hard to pull off.

This is the 9/11 idea: a single huge event that affects the entire nation.



The third category consists of low-tech attacks that go on and

on. Several people imagined a version of the DC sniper scenario, but with

multiple teams. The teams would slowly move around the country, perhaps

each team starting up after the previous one was captured or killed.

Other people suggested a variant of this with small bombs in random public

locations around the country.



(There’s a fourth category: actual movie plots. Some entries are

comical, unrealistic, have science fiction premises, etc. I’m not even

considering those.)



The better ideas tap directly into public fears. In my book, Beyond Fear,

I discussed five different tendencies people have to exaggerate risks: to

believe that something is more risky than it actually is.



1. People exaggerate spectacular but rare risks and downplay common risks.



2. People have trouble estimating risks for anything not exactly like

their normal situation.



3. Personified risks are perceived to be greater than anonymous risks.



4. People underestimate risks they willingly take and overestimate

risks in situations they can’t control.



5. People overestimate risks that are being talked about and remain an

object of public scrutiny.



The best plot ideas leverage one or more of those

tendencies. Big-ticket attacks leverage the first. Infrastructure and

low-tech attacks leverage the fourth. And every attack tries to leverage

the fifth, especially those attacks that go on and on. I’m willing to bet

that when I find a winner, it will be the plot that leverages the greatest

number of those tendencies to the best possible advantage.



I also got a bunch of e-mails from people with ideas they thought too

terrifying to post publicly. Some of them wouldn’t even tell them to me.

I also received e-mails from people accusing me of helping the terrorists

by giving them ideas.



But if there’s one thing this contest demonstrates, it’s that good

terrorist ideas are a dime a dozen. Anyone can figure out how to cause

terror. The hard part is execution.



Some of the submitted plots require minimal skill and

equipment. Twenty guys with cars and guns – that sort of

thing. Reading through them, you have to wonder why there have been no

terrorist attacks in the U.S. since 9/11. I don’t believe the “flypaper

theory” that the terrorists are all in Iraq instead of in the U.S. And

despite all the ineffectual security we’ve put in place since 9/11, I’m

sure we have had some successes in intelligence and investigation – and

have made it harder for terrorists to operate both in the U.S. and abroad.



But mostly, I think terrorist attacks are much harder than most of us

think. It’s harder to find willing recruits than we think. It’s harder

to coordinate plans. It’s harder to execute those plans. Terrorism is

rare, and for all we’ve heard about 9/11 changing the world, it’s still

rare.



The submission deadline was the end of April month, but please keep

posting plots if you think of them. And please read through some of the

others and comment on them; I’m curious as to what other people think are

the most interesting, compelling, realistic, or effective scenarios.



I’m reading through them, and will have a winner by the next Crypto-Gram.



Contest:

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/04/announcing_movi.html



Flypaper theory:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flypaper_theory_%28strategy%29



The contest made The New York Times:

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/movies/23peterson.html?ex=1303444800&e

n=c7ccc8d756fc98e7&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss or

http://tinyurl.com/qyh3b





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Who Owns Your Computer?







When technology serves its owners, it is liberating. When it is

designed to serve others, over the owner’s objection, it is oppressive.

There’s a battle raging on your computer right now – one that pits you

against worms and viruses, Trojans, spyware, automatic update features and

digital rights management technologies. It’s the battle to determine who

owns your computer.



You own your computer, of course. You bought it. You paid for it. But how

much control do you really have over what happens on your machine?

Technically you might have bought the hardware and software, but you have

less control over what it’s doing behind the scenes.



Using the hacker sense of the term, your computer is “owned” by other

people.



It used to be that only malicious hackers were trying to own your

computers. Whether through worms, viruses, Trojans or other means, they

would try to install some kind of remote-control program onto your system.

Then they’d use your computers to sniff passwords, make fraudulent bank

transactions, send spam, initiate phishing attacks and so on. Estimates

are that somewhere between hundreds of thousands and millions of computers

are members of remotely controlled “bot” networks. Owned.



Now, things are not so simple. There are all sorts of interests vying for

control of your computer. There are media companies that want to control

what you can do with the music and videos they sell you. There are

companies that use software as a conduit to collect marketing information,

deliver advertising or do whatever it is their real owners require. And

there are software companies that are trying to make money by pleasing not

only their customers, but other companies they ally themselves with. All

these companies want to own your computer.



Some examples:



1. Entertainment software: In October 2005, it emerged that Sony had

distributed a rootkit with several music CDs – the same kind of software

that crackers use to own people’s computers. This rootkit secretly

installed itself when the music CD was played on a computer. Its purpose

was to prevent people from doing things with the music that Sony didn’t

approve of: It was a DRM system. If the exact same piece of software had

been installed secretly by a hacker, this would have been an illegal act.

But Sony believed that it had legitimate reasons for wanting to own its

customers’ machines.



2. Antivirus: You might have expected your antivirus software to detect

Sony’s rootkit. After all, that’s why you bought it. But initially, the

security programs sold by Symantec and others did not detect it, because

Sony had asked them not to. You might have thought that the software you

bought was working for you, but you would have been wrong.



3. Internet services: Hotmail allows you to blacklist certain e-mail

addresses, so that mail from them automatically goes into your spam trap.

Have you ever tried blocking all that incessant marketing e-mail from

Microsoft? You can’t.



4. Application software: Internet Explorer users might have expected the

program to incorporate easy-to-use cookie handling and pop-up blockers.

After all, other browsers do, and users have found them useful in

defending against Internet annoyances. But Microsoft isn’t just selling

software to you; it sells Internet advertising as well. It isn’t in the

company’s best interest to offer users features that would adversely

affect its business partners.



5. Spyware: Spyware is nothing but someone else trying to own your

computer. These programs eavesdrop on your behavior and report back to

their real owners – sometimes without your knowledge or consent – about

your behavior.



6. Update: Automatic update features are another way software companies

try to own your computer. While they can be useful for improving security,

they also require you to trust your software vendor not to disable your

computer for nonpayment, breach of contract or other presumed infractions.



Adware, software-as-a-service and Google Desktop search are all

examples of some other company trying to own your computer. And Trusted

Computing will only make the problem worse.



There is an inherent insecurity to technologies that try to own

people’s computers: They allow individuals other than the computers’

legitimate owners to enforce policy on those machines. These systems

invite attackers to assume the role of the third party and turn a user’s

device against him.



Remember the Sony story: The most insecure feature in that DRM system was

a cloaking mechanism that gave the rootkit control over whether you could

see it executing or spot its files on your hard disk. By taking ownership

away from you, it reduced your security.



If left to grow, these external control systems will fundamentally

change your relationship with your computer. They will make your

computer much less useful by letting corporations limit what you can do

with it. They will make your computer much less reliable because you will

no longer have control of what is running on your machine, what it does,

and how the various software components interact. At the extreme, they

will transform your computer into a glorified boob tube.



You can fight back against this trend by only using software that

respects your boundaries. Boycott companies that don’t honestly serve

their customers, that don’t disclose their alliances, that treat users

like marketing assets. Use open-source software – software created and

owned by users, with no hidden agendas, no secret alliances and no

back-room marketing deals.



Just because computers were a liberating force in the past doesn’t mean

they will be in the future. There is enormous political and economic power

behind the idea that you shouldn’t truly own your computer or your

software, despite having paid for it.



This essay originally appeared on Wired.com.

http://www.wired.com/news/columns/1,70802-0.html



Trusted computing:

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0208.html#1





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Crypto-Gram Reprints







Crypto-Gram is currently in its ninth year of publication. Back issues

cover a variety of security-related topics, and can all be found on

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-back.html. These are a selection of

articles that appeared in this calendar month in other years.



REAL-ID

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0505.html#2



Should Terrorism be Reported in the News?

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0505.html#3



Combating Spam

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0505.html#15



Warrants as a Security Countermeasure

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0405.html#1



National Security Consumers

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0405.html#9



Encryption and Wiretapping

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0305.html#1



Unique E-Mail Addresses and Spam

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0305.html#6



Secrecy, Security, and Obscurity

http://www.schneier.com./crypto-gram-0205.html#1



Fun with Fingerprint Readers

http://www.schneier.com./crypto-gram-0205.html#5



What Military History Can Teach Network Security, Part 2

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0105.html#1



The Futility of Digital Copy Protection

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0105.html#3



Security Standards

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0105.html#7



Safe Personal Computing

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0105.html#8



Computer Security: Will we Ever Learn?

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0005.html#1



Trusted Client Software

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0005.html#6



The IL*VEYOU Virus (Title bowdlerized to foil automatic e-mail filters.)

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0005.html#ilyvirus



The Internationalization of Cryptography

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9905.html#international



The British discovery of public-key cryptography

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9805.html#nonsecret





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Identity-Theft Disclosure Laws







California was the first state to pass a law requiring companies that keep

personal data to disclose when that data is lost or stolen. Since then,

many states have followed suit. Now Congress is debating federal

legislation that would do the same thing nationwide.



Except that it won’t do the same thing: The federal bill has become so

watered down that it won’t be very effective. I would still be in favor of

it – a poor federal law is better than none – if it didn’t also pre-empt

more-effective state laws, which makes it a net loss.



Identity theft is the fastest-growing area of crime. It’s badly named –

your identity is the one thing that cannot be stolen – and is better

thought of as fraud by impersonation. A criminal collects enough personal

information about you to be able to impersonate you to banks, credit card

companies, brokerage houses, etc. Posing as you, he steals your money, or

takes a destructive joyride on your good credit.



Many companies keep large databases of personal data that is useful to

these fraudsters. But because the companies don’t shoulder the cost of the

fraud, they’re not economically motivated to secure those databases very

well. In fact, if your personal data is stolen from their databases, they

would much rather not even tell you: Why deal with the bad publicity?



Disclosure laws force companies to make these security breaches public.

This is a good idea for three reasons. One, it is good security practice

to notify potential identity theft victims that their personal information

has been lost or stolen. Two, statistics on actual data thefts are

valuable for research purposes. And three, the potential cost of the

notification and the associated bad publicity naturally leads companies to

spend more money on protecting personal information – or to refrain from

collecting it in the first place.



Think of it as public shaming. Companies will spend money to avoid the PR

costs of this shaming, and security will improve. In economic terms, the

law reduces the externalities and forces companies to deal with the true

costs of these data breaches.



This public shaming needs the cooperation of the press and,

unfortunately, there’s an attenuation effect going on. The first major

breach after California passed its disclosure law – SB1386 – was in

February 2005, when ChoicePoint sold personal data on 145,000 people to

criminals. The event was all over the news, and ChoicePoint was shamed

into improving its security.



Then LexisNexis exposed personal data on 300,000 individuals. And

Citigroup lost data on 3.9 million individuals. SB1386 worked; the only

reason we knew about these security breaches was because of the law. But

the breaches came in increasing numbers, and in larger quantities. After a

while, it was no longer news. And when the press stopped reporting, the

“cost” of these breaches to the companies declined.



Today, the only real cost that remains is the cost of notifying

customers and issuing replacement cards. It costs banks about $10 to issue

a new card, and that’s money they would much rather not have to spend.

This is the agenda they brought to the federal bill, cleverly titled the

Data Accountability and Trust Act, or DATA.



Lobbyists attacked the legislation in two ways. First, they went after the

definition of personal information. Only the exposure of very specific

information requires disclosure. For example, the theft of a database that

contained people’s first *initial*, middle name, last name, Social

Security number, bank account number, address, phone number, date of

birth, mother’s maiden name and password would not have to be disclosed,

because “personal information” is defined as “an individual’s first and

last name in combination with …” certain other personal data.



Second, lobbyists went after the definition of “breach of security.” The

latest version of the bill reads: “The term ‘breach of security’ means the

unauthorized acquisition of data in electronic form containing personal

information that establishes a reasonable basis to conclude that there is

a significant risk of identity theft to the individuals to whom the

personal information relates.”



Get that? If a company loses a backup tape containing millions of

individuals’ personal information, it doesn’t have to disclose if it

believes there is no “significant risk of identity theft.” If it leaves a

database exposed, and has absolutely no audit logs of who accessed that

database, it could claim it has no “reasonable basis” to conclude there is

a significant risk. Actually, the company could point to a ID Analytics

study that showed the probability of fraud to someone who has been the

victim of this kind of data loss to be less than 1 in 1,000 – which is

not a “significant risk” – and then not disclose the data breach at all.



Even worse, this federal law pre-empts the 23 existing state laws – and

others being considered – many of which contain stronger individual

protections. So while DATA might look like a law protecting consumers

nationwide, it is actually a law protecting companies with large databases

*from* state laws protecting consumers.



So in its current form, this legislation would make things worse, not

better.



Of course, things are in flux. They’re *always* in flux. The language of

the bill has changed regularly over the past year, as various committees

got their hands on it. There’s also another bill, HR3997, which is even

worse. And even if something passes, it has to be reconciled with whatever

the Senate passes, and then voted on again. So no one really knows what

the final language will look like.



But the devil is in the details, and the only way to protect us from

lobbyists tinkering with the details is to ensure that the federal bill

does not pre-empt any state bills: that the federal law is a minimum, but

that states can require more.



That said, disclosure is important, but it’s not going to solve

identity theft. As I’ve written previously, the reason theft of

personal information is so common is that the data is so valuable. The way

to mitigate the risk of fraud due to impersonation is not to make personal

information harder to steal, it’s to make it harder to use.



Disclosure laws only deal with the economic externality of data brokers

protecting your personal information. What we really need are laws

prohibiting credit card companies and other financial institutions from

granting credit to someone using your name with only a minimum of

authentication.



But until that happens, we can at least hope that Congress will refrain

from passing bad bills that override good state laws – and helping

criminals in the process.



California’s SB 1386:

http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386_bill_2002

0926_chaptered.html or http://tinyurl.com/dgh0



Existing state disclosure laws:

http://www.pirg.org/consumer/credit/statelaws.htm

http://www.cwalsh.org/cgi-bin/blosxom.cgi/2006/04/20#breachlaws



HR 4127 – Data Accountability and Trust Act:

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c109:./temp/~c109XvxF76



HR 3997:

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c109:./temp/~c109gnLQGA



ID Analytics study:

http://www.idanalytics.com/news_and_events/20051208.htm



My essay on identity theft:

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/04/mitigating_iden.html



A version of this essay originally appeared on Wired.com:

http://www.wired.com/news/columns/0,70690-0.html





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When “Off” Doesn’t Mean Off







According to the specs of the new Nintendo Wii (its new game machine),

“Wii can communicate with the Internet even when the power is turned off.”

Nintendo accentuates the positive: “This WiiConnect24 service delivers a

new surprise or game update, even if users do not play with Wii,” while

ignoring the possibility that Nintendo can deactivate a game if it chooses

to do so, or that someone else can deliver a different – not so wanted –

surprise.



We all know that, but what’s interesting here is that Nintendo is

changing the meaning of the word “off.” We are all conditioned to

believe that “off” means off, and therefore safe. But in Nintendo’s case,

“off” really means something like “on standby.” If users expect the

Nintendo Wii to be truly off, they need to pull the power plug – assuming

there isn’t a battery foiling that tactic. There seems to be no way to

disconnect the Internet, as the Nintendo Wii is wireless only.



Maybe there is no way to turn the Nintendo Wii off.



There’s a serious security problem here, made worse by a bad user

interface. “Off” should mean off.



http://wii.nintendo.com/hardware.html





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News







It’s a provocative headline: “Triple DES Upgrades May Introduce New ATM

Vulnerabilities.” Basically, at the same time ATM machine owners

upgrading their encryption to triple-DES, they’re also moving the

communications links from dedicated lines to the Internet. And while the

protocol encrypts PINs, it doesn’t encrypt any of the other information,

such as card numbers and expiration dates. So it’s the move from

dedicated lines to the Internet that’s adding the insecurities, not the

triple-DES upgrades.

http://www.paymentsnews.com/2006/04/redspin_triple_.html



Someone filed change-of-address forms with the post office to divert other

people’s mail to himself. 170 times. “Postal Service spokeswoman

Patricia Licata said a credit card is required for security reasons. ‘We

have systems in place to prevent this type of occurrence,’ she said, but

declined further comment on the specific case until officials have time to

analyze what happened.” Sounds like those systems don’t work very well.

http://www.wvec.com/news/local/stories/wvec_local_041306_mail_scam.31210

0f4.html



A deniable file system:

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/04/deniable_file_s.html



Great hoax video: graffiti on Air Force One:

http://www.stillfree.com/

http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=1875386



The Department of Homeland Security has released a Request for Proposal –

that’s the document asking industry if anyone can do what it wants – for

the Secure Border Initiative.

http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/1_1/daily_news/28381-1.html



Stuntz and Solove Debate Privacy and Transparency

http://www.tnr.com/user/nregi.mhtml?i=20060417&s=stuntz041706

http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/04/william_stuntzs.html#

more or http://tinyurl.com/o4jte

http://www.tnr.com/user/nregi.mhtml?i=20060417&s=stuntz041706

http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/04/stuntz_responds.html or

http://tinyurl.com/mqrzt



Terrorist travel advisory: “My son and I woke up Sunday morning and drove

a rented truck to New York City to move his worldly goods into an

apartment there. As we made it to the Holland Tunnel, after traveling the

Tony Soprano portion of the Jersey Turnpike with a blue moon in our eyes,

the woman in the tollbooth informed us that, since 9/11, trucks were not

allowed in the tunnel; we’d have to use the Lincoln Tunnel, she said. So

if you are a terrorist trying to get into New York from Jersey, be advised

that you’re going to have to use the Lincoln Tunnel.”

http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06110/683563-294.stm



The Kryptos Sculpture is located in the center of the CIA Headquarters in

Langley, VA. It was designed in 1990, and contains a four-part encrypted

puzzle. The first three parts have been solved, but now we’ve learned

that the second-part solution was wrong and has been re-solved:

http://www.elonka.com/kryptos/CorrectedK2Announcement.html

http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,70701-0.html More on the sculpture:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kryptos http://www.elonka.com/kryptos/ Blog

entry URL:

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/04/the_kryptos_scu.html



Mafia boss secures his data with Caesar cipher.

http://dsc.discovery.com/news/briefs/20060417/mafiaboss_tec.html



Microsoft Vista’s endless security warnings:

http://www.winsupersite.com/reviews/winvista_5308_05.asp

The problem with lots of warning dialog boxes is that they don’t

provide security. Users stop reading them. They think of them as

annoyances, as an extra click required to get a feature to

work. Clicking through gets embedded into muscle memory, and when it

actually matters the user won’t even realize it.

http://www.codinghorror.com/blog/archives/000571.html

http://west-wind.com/weblog/posts/4678.aspx These dialog boxes are not

security for the user, they’re CYA security *from* the user. When some

piece of malware trashes your system, Microsoft can say: “You gave the

program permission to do that; it’s not our fault.” Warning dialog boxes

are only effective if the user has the ability to make intelligent

decisions about the warnings. If the user cannot do that, they’re just

annoyances. And they’re annoyances that don’t improve security.

http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ou/?p=209



Digital cameras have unique fingerprints:

http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2006-04/bu-bur041806.php

Interesting research, but there’s one important aspect of this

fingerprint that the article did not talk about: how easy is it to

forge? Can someone analyze 100 images from a given camera, and then

doctor a pre-existing picture so that it appeared to come from that

camera? My guess is that it can be done relatively easily.



Kaspersky Labs reports on extortion scams using malware:

http://www.viruslist.com/en/analysis?pubid=184012401#crypto

Among other worms, the article discusses the GpCode.ac worm, which

encrypts data using 56-bit RSA (no, that’s not a typo). The whole

article is interesting reading.



Larry Beinhart makes an interesting case for the elimination of most

government secrecy.

http://www.buzzflash.com/contributors/06/04/con06131.html He has a good

argument, although I think the issue is a bit more complicated.

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0205.html#1



“Security Myths and Passwords,” by Gene Spafford:

http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/weblogs/spaf/general/post-30



There was a code in the judge’s ruling on the Da Vinci Code plagiarism

case. It was solved way too quickly after it was discovered, because the

judge gave out some really obvious hints. But you can read about it here:

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/04/da_vinci_code_r.html



As an aside, I am mentioned in Da Vinci Code. No, really. Page 199 of

the American hardcover edition. “Da Vinci had been a cryptography

pioneer, Sophie knew, although he was seldom given credit. Sophie’s

university instructors, while presenting computer encryption methods for

securing data, praised modern cryptologists like Zimmermann and Schneier

but failed to mention that it was Leonardo who had invented one of the

first rudimentary forms of public key encryption centuries ago.” That’s

right. I am a realistic background detail.

http://fishbowl.pastiche.org/2004/07/06/house_of_cards



Technology Review has an interesting article discussing some of the

technologies used by the NSA in its warrantless wiretapping program, some

of them from the killed Total Information Awareness (TIA) program.

http://www.technologyreview.com/read_article.aspx?ch=infotech&sc=&id=167

41&pg=1 or http://tinyurl.com/ruafx



John Dvorak argues that Internet Explorer was Microsoft’s greatest

mistake ever. Certainly its decision to tightly integrate IE with the

operating system – done as an anti-competitive maneuver against Netscape

during the Browser Wars – has resulted in some enormous security problems

that Microsoft has still not recovered from. Not even with the

introduction of IE7.

http://www.pcmag.com/print_article2/0,1217,a=176507,00.asp



Security in comics: attackers are adaptable:

http://www.comics.com/comics/hedge/archive/hedge-20060423.html



We’ve talked about counterfeit money, counterfeit concert tickets,

counterfeit police credentials, and counterfeit police

departments. Here’s a story about a counterfeit company.

http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/27/business/nec.php



Verizon has announced that it has activated the Access Overload Control

(ACCOLC) system, allowing some cell phones to have priority access to the

network, even when the network is overloaded. Sounds like you’re going to

have to enter some sort of code into your handset. I wonder how long

before someone hacks that system.

http://www.pcsintel.com/content/view/1293/0/



An arson squad blows up a news rack, mistaking a promotion for Tom

Cruise’s new movie for a bomb. Really; you can’t make this kind of

stuff up.

http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_con

tent_id=1002425411 or http://tinyurl.com/n3286



Assault weapon that passes through X-ray machines.

http://www.promoinnovations.com/xray.htm



A man sues Compaq for false advertising. He bought the computer

because it was advertised as totally secure. But after he committed some

crimes and the FBI got his computer, they were able to recover his data.

This is what I said in the article: “Unfortunately, this probably isn’t a

great case. Here’s a man who’s not going to get much sympathy. You want a

defendant who bought the Compaq computer, and then, you know, his

competitor, or a rogue employee, or someone who broke into his office, got

the data. That’s a much more sympathetic defendant.”

http://hartfordadvocate.com/gbase/News/content?oid=oid:153106



Infant identity theft victim:

http://www.abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=155878&page=1



An improv group in New York dressed up like Best Buy employees and went

into a store, secretly videotaping the results. My favorite part:

“Security guards and managers started talking to each other frantically on

their walkie-talkies and headsets. ‘Thomas Crown Affair! Thomas Crown

Affair!,’ one employee shouted. They were worried that we were using our

fake uniforms to stage some type of elaborate heist. ‘I want every

available employee out on the floor RIGHT NOW!'”

http://www.improveverywhere.com/mission_view.php?mission_id=57



Stealing cars with laptops:

http://www.leftlanenews.com/2006/05/03/gone-in-20-minutes-using-laptops-

to-steal-cars/ or http://tinyurl.com/mkr9s

http://slashdot.org/articles/06/05/03/1928256.shtml



The rapper MC Plus+ has written a song about cryptography, “Alice and

Bob.” It mentions DES, AES, Blowfish, RSA, SHA-1, and more. And me!

http://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/anavabi/mp3/MC%20Plus+%20-%20Algorhythms%

20-%20Alice%20and%20Bob.mp3 or http://tinyurl.com/8jov2 Here’s an article

about “geeksta rap.”

http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,67970,00.html



The DHS secretly shares European air passenger data in violation of

agreement:

http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/25335prs20060425.html



Shell has suspended its chip-and-pin payment system in the UK, after

fraudsters stole over one million pounds. Lots of details on my blog:

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/05/shell_suspends.html



According to this article, the ultimate terrorist threat is flying

robot drones. The article really pegs the movie-plot threat hype-meter.

http://www.physorg.com/news66197469.html



A reporter finds an old British Airways boarding pass, and proceeds to use

it to find everything else about the person.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,,1766138,00.html Notice the economic

pressures: “‘The problem here is that a commercial organisation is being

given the task of collecting data on behalf of a foreign government, for

which it gets no financial reward, and which offers no business benefit in

return,’ says Laurie. ‘Naturally, in such a case, they will seek to

minimise their costs, which they do by handing the problem off to the

passengers themselves. This has the neat side-effect of also handing off

liability for data errors.'”



Five stories of RFID hacking:

http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.05/rfid.html



And IBM thinks it has a solution: a removable tag that reduces the

range of the RFID chip:

http://wired.com/news/technology/0,70793-0.html

Why not disable it entirely?



Serious computer problems inside the NSA:

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/custom/attack/bal-te.nsa26feb26,0,63111

75.story or http://tinyurl.com/rgrso



Meanwhile, the NSA is building a massive traffic-analysis database on

Americans’ calling patterns:

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm

http://www.prospect.org/weblog/2006/05/post_336.html#002317

http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006/05/no-need-for-congress-no-need-

for.html

http://www.orinkerr.com/2006/05/11/thoughts-on-the-legality-of-the-lates

t-nsa-surveillance-program/

http://www.orinkerr.com/2006/05/12/more-thoughts-on-the-legality-of-the-

nsa-call-records-program/



Major vulnerability found in Diebold election machines. This one is a big

deal. http://www.insidebayarea.com/ci_3805089

http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVtsxstudy.pdf



Comparing the security of election machines with the security of slot

machines:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2006/03/16/GR200603

1600213.html or http://tinyurl.com/gda98



Thief disguises himself as a museum guard and tricks employees into

giving him 200,000 euros:

http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=oddlyEnoughNews&stor

yid=2006-05-03T204308Z_01_L02306327_RTRUKOC_0_US-ITALY-THIEF.xml or

http://tinyurl.com/j3q6k



Fascinating first-person account of being on the TSA’s watch list:

http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060506-6767.html



Reconceptualizing national intelligence:

http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2006/05/curing_analytic_pathologies.html

or http://tinyurl.com/lc2of



Public-key cryptography for digital notarization in Pennsylvania.

http://www.nationalnotary.org/news/index.cfm?Text=newsNotary&newsID=851 or

http://tinyurl.com/r9z4w

http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1955701,00.asp





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RFID Cards and Man-in-the-Middle Attacks







Recent articles about a proposed US-Canada and US-Mexico travel

document (kind of like a passport, but less useful), with an embedded RFID

chip that can be read up to 25 feet away, have once again made RFID

security newsworthy.



My views have not changed. The most secure solution is a smart card that

only works in contact with a reader; RFID is much more risky. But if

we’re stuck with RFID, the combination of shielding for the chip, basic

access control security measures, and some positive action by the user to

get the chip to operate is a good one. The devil is in the details, of

course, but those are good starting points.



And when you start proposing chips with a 25-foot read range, you need to

worry about man-in-the-middle attacks. An attacker could potentially

impersonate the card of a nearby person to an official reader, just by

relaying messages to and from that nearby person’s card.



Here’s how the attack would work. In this scenario, customs Agent

Alice has the official card reader. Bob is the innocent traveler, in line

at some border crossing. Mallory is the malicious attacker, ahead of Bob

in line at the same border crossing, who is going to impersonate Bob to

Alice. Mallory’s equipment includes an RFID reader and transmitter.



Assume that the card has to be activated in some way. Maybe the cover has

to be opened, or the card taken out of a sleeve. Maybe the card has a

button to push in order to activate it. Also assume the card has come

challenge-reply security protocol and an encrypted key exchange protocol

of some sort.



1. Alice’s reader sends a message to Mallory’s RFID chip.



2. Mallory’s reader/transmitter receives the message, and rebroadcasts it

to Bob’s chip. (Bob is somewhere else, out of Alice’s range.)



3. Bob’s chip responds normally to a valid message from Alice’s

reader. He has no way of knowing that Mallory relayed the message.



4. Mallory’s reader transmitter receives Bob’s message and rebroadcasts it

to Alice. Alice has no way of knowing that the message was relayed.



5. Mallory continues to relay messages back and forth between Alice and

Bob.



Defending against this attack is hard. (I talk more about the attack in

Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, page 109.) Time stamps don’t help.

Encryption doesn’t help. It works because Mallory is simply acting as an

amplifier. Mallory might not be able to read the messages. He might not

even know who Bob is. But he doesn’t care. All he knows is that Alice

thinks he’s Bob.



Precise timing can catch this attack, because of the extra delay that

Mallory’s relay introduces. But I don’t think this is part of the spec.



The attack can be easily countered if Alice looks at Mallory’s card and

compares the information printed on it with what she’s receiving over the

RFID link. But near as I can tell, the point of the 25-foot read distance

is so cards can be authenticated in bulk, from a distance.



According to the news.com article: “Homeland Security has said, in a

government procurement notice posted in September, that “read ranges shall

extend to a minimum of 25 feet” in RFID-equipped identification cards used

for border crossings. For people crossing on a bus, the proposal says,

‘the solution must sense up to 55 tokens.'”



If Mallory is on that bus, he can impersonate any nearby Bob who

activates his RFID card early. And at a crowded border crossing, the odds

of some Bob doing that are pretty good.



From the Federal Computer Week article: “If that were done, the PASS

system would automatically screen the cardbearers against criminal watch

lists and put the information on the border guard’s screen by the time the

vehicle got to the station, Williams said.”



And would predispose the guard to think that everything’s okay, even if it

isn’t.



I don’t think people are thinking this one through.



http://news.com.com/New+RFID+travel+cards+could+pose+privacy+threat/2100

-1028_3-6062574.html or http://tinyurl.com/le82d

http://www.fcw.com/article94113-04-18-06-Web



My views on RFID identity cards:

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/08/rfid_passport_s_1.html





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Software Failure Causes Airport Evacuation







Last month I wrote about airport passenger screening, and mentioned

that the X-ray equipment inserts “test” bags into the stream in order to

keep screeners more alert. That system failed pretty badly earlier this

week at Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson Airport, when a false alarm resulted

in a two-hour evacuation of the entire airport.



The screening system injects test images onto the screen. Normally the

software flashes the words “This is a test” on the screen after a brief

delay, but this time the software failed to indicate that. The screener

noticed the image (of a “suspicious device,” according to CNN) and, per

procedure, screeners manually checked the bags on the conveyor belt for

it. They couldn’t find it, of course, but they evacuated the airport and

spent two hours vainly searching for it.



Hartsfield-Jackson is the country’s busiest passenger airport. It’s

Delta’s hub city. The delays were felt across the country for the rest of

the day.



Okay, so what went wrong here? Clearly the software failed. Just as

clearly the screener procedures didn’t fail – everyone did what they were

supposed to do.



What is less obvious is that the system failed. It failed, because it was

not designed to fail well. A small failure – in this case, a software

glitch in a single X-ray machine – cascaded in such a way as to shut down

the entire airport. This kind of failure magnification is common in

poorly designed security systems. Better would be for there to be

individual X-ray machines at the gates – I’ve seen this design at several

European airports – so that when there’s a problem the effects are

restricted to that gate.



Of course, this distributed security solution would be more

expensive. But I’m willing to bet it would be cheaper overall, taking

into account the cost of occasionally clearing out an airport.



http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/04/20/atlanta.airport/index.html



What I wrote last month:

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/airport_passeng.html





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Counterpane News







On May 23, Schneier will be opening a new speaking series by the ACLU with

a talk on “The Future of Privacy.”

http://www.aclu.org/privacy/25551res20060512.html



Schneier will be speaking at the Gartner IT Security Summit in

Washington DC, June 5-7:

http://www.gartner.com/2_events/conferences/sec12.jsp



Schneier will be speaking at the ACLU New Jersey Membership Conference:

https://www.aclu-nj.org/events/aclunjmembershipconference



Schneier will be speaking at the ACLU Vermont Privacy Conference:

http://www.acluvt.org/news/display.php?sid=1145047166&PHPSESSID=31bdcefa

418904b0caab1ffbde1f8a64 or http://tinyurl.com/pdzyy



Tipping Point is offering Managed Security Services through an alliance

with Counterpane: http://www.counterpane.com/pr-20060501.html





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Microsoft’s BitLocker







BitLocker Drive Encryption is a new security feature in Windows Vista,

designed to work with the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Basically, it

encrypts the C drive with a computer-generated key. In its basic mode, an

attacker can still access the data on the drive by guessing the user’s

password, but would not be able to get at the drive by booting the disk up

using another operating system, or removing the drive and attaching it to

another computer.



There are several modes for BitLocker. In the simplest mode, the TPM

stores the key and the whole thing happens completely invisibly. The user

does nothing differently, and notices nothing different.



The BitLocker key can also be stored on a USB drive. Here, the user has

to insert the USB drive into the computer during boot. Then there’s a

mode that uses a key stored in the TPM and a key stored on a USB drive.

And finally, there’s a mode that uses a key stored in the TPM and a

four-digit PIN that the user types into the computer. This happens early

in the boot process, when there’s still ASCII text on the screen.



Note that if you configure BitLocker with a USB key or a PIN, password

guessing doesn’t work. BitLocker doesn’t even let you get to a password

screen to try.



For most people, basic mode is the best. People will keep their USB key

in their computer bag with their laptop, so it won’t add much security.

But if you can force users to attach it to their key chains – remember

that you only need the key to boot the computer, not to operate the

computer – and convince them to go through the trouble of sticking it in

their computer every time they boot, then you’ll get a higher level of

security.



There is a recovery key: optional but strongly encouraged. It is

automatically generated by BitLocker, and it can be sent to some

administrator or printed out and stored in some secure location. There

are ways for an administrator to set group policy settings mandating this

key.



There aren’t any back doors for the police, though.



You can get BitLocker to work in systems without a TPM, but it’s

kludgy. You can only configure it for a USB key. And it only will

work on some hardware: because BitLocker starts running before any

device drivers are loaded, the BIOS must recognize USB drives in order for

BitLocker to work.



Encryption particulars: The default data encryption algorithm is

AES-128-CBC with an additional diffuser. The diffuser is designed to

protect against ciphertext-manipulation attacks, and is independently

keyed from AES-CBC so that it cannot damage the security you get from

AES-CBC. Administrators can select the disk encryption algorithm through

group policy. Choices are 128-bit AES-CBC plus the diffuser, 256-bit

AES-CBC plus the diffuser, 128-bit AES-CBC, and 256-bit AES-CBC. (My

advice: stick with the default.) The key management system uses 256-bit

keys wherever possible. The only place where a 128-bit key limit is

hard-coded is the recovery key, which is 48 digits (including checksums).

It’s shorter because it has to be typed in manually; typing in 96 digits

will piss off a lot of people – even if it is only for data recovery.



So, does this destroy dual-boot systems? Not really. If you have

Vista running, then set up a dual boot system, BitLocker will consider

this sort of change to be an attack and refuse to run. But then you can

use the recovery key to boot into Windows, then tell BitLocker to take the

current configuration – with the dual boot code – as correct. After

that, your dual boot system will work just fine, or so I’ve been told.

You still won’t be able to share any files on your C drive between

operating systems, but you will be able to share files on any other drive.



The problem is that it’s impossible to distinguish between a legitimate

dual boot system and an attacker trying to use another OS – whether Linux

or another instance of Vista – to get at the volume.



BitLocker is not a DRM system. However, it is straightforward to turn it

into a DRM system. Simply give programs the ability to require that files

be stored only on BitLocker-enabled drives, and then only be transferable

to other BitLocker-enabled drives. How easy this would be to implement,

and how hard it would be to subvert, depends on the details of the system.



BitLocker is also not a panacea. But it does mitigate a specific but

significant risk: the risk of attackers getting at data on drives

directly. It allows people to throw away or sell old drives without

worry. It allows people to stop worrying about their drives getting lost

or stolen. It stops a particular attack against data.



Right now BitLocker is only in the Ultimate and Enterprise editions of

Vista. It’s a feature that is turned off by default. It is also

Microsoft’s first TPM application. Presumably it will be enhanced in the

future: allowing the encryption of other drives would be a good next step,

for example.



http://www.microsoft.com/technet/windowsvista/library/help/b7931dd8-3152

-4d3a-a9b5-84621660c5f5.mspx?mfr=true or http://tinyurl.com/fywd7

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/windowsvista/library/c61f2a12-8ae6-4957

-b031-97b4d762cf31.mspx or http://tinyurl.com/h4nc8



Niels Ferguson on back doors:

http://blogs.msdn.com/si_team/archive/2006/03/02/542590.aspx



BitLocker and dual boot systems:

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/04/27/schneier_infosec/

http://arstechnica.com/journals/microsoft.ars/2006/4/28/3782





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The Security Risk of Special Cases







In Beyond Fear, I wrote about the inherent security risks of exceptions to

a security policy. Here’s an example, from airport security in Ireland.



Police officers are permitted to bypass airport security at the Dublin

Airport. They flash their ID, and walk around the checkpoints.



“A female member of the airport search unit is undergoing re-training

after the incident in which a Department of Transport inspector passed

unchecked through security screening.



“It is understood that the department official was waved through

security checks having flashed an official badge. The inspector

immediately notified airport authorities of a failure in vetting

procedures. Only gardai are permitted to pass unchecked through security.”



There are two ways this failure could have happened. One, security

person could have thought that Department of Transportation officials have

the same privileges as police officers. And two, the security person

could have thought she was being shown a police ID.



This could have just as easily been a bad guy showing a fake police

ID. My guess is that the security people don’t check them all that

carefully.



The meta-point is that exceptions to security are themselves security

vulnerabilities. As soon as you create a system by which some people can

bypass airport security checkpoints, you invite the bad guys to try and

use that system. There are reasons why you might want to create those

alternate paths through security, of course, but the trade-offs should be

well thought out.



http://archives.tcm.ie/businesspost/2006/04/16/story13502.asp





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Comments from Readers







There are hundreds of comments – many of them interesting – on these

topics on my blog. Search for the story you want to comment on, and join

in.



http://www.schneier.com/blog





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CRYPTO-GRAM is written by Bruce Schneier. Schneier is the author of the

best sellers “Beyond Fear,” “Secrets and Lies,” and “Applied

Cryptography,” and an inventor of the Blowfish and Twofish algorithms. He

is founder and CTO of Counterpane Internet Security Inc., and is a member

of the Advisory Board of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC).

He is a frequent writer and lecturer on security topics. See

http://www.schneier.com.



Counterpane is the world’s leading protector of networked information –

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Copyright © 2006 by Bruce Schneier.



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